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The need to address the shortcomings of Egypt’s current social 
protection system as part of a broader process of developing a new social 
contract between the Egyptian government and its citizens has been 
noted for a number of years. With a new government recently put in 
place, Egypt is now at a potential turning point in terms of implementing 
unfinished reforms to the system or proposing alternative ones. The 
aim of this paper is therefore to provide an overview and assessment of 
current public social protection mechanisms and suggest directions for 
new policy measures. The social and health insurance systems are covered, 
as well as the social assistance program that provides non-contributory 
pensions. Recommended policy measures to improve the current social 
protection system fall into three inter-related categories: strengthening 
the link between contribution and benefit levels, expanding coverage, and 
improving the administration of the system.
1. Introduction 
Social protection is an important component of the social contract 
between a government and its citizens in any country.  In Egypt, an extensive 
social protection system was one of the cornerstones of the state-centered 
social policy model developed in the 1950s and 1960s (World Bank 2006). 
This system, which includes social insurance, health insurance, and social 
assistance mechanisms, remains in place today without having seen any 
major reforms.1 The expansion of social protection under the current 
system was heavily based on growth in government employment and 
the extension of social protection benefits to public sector employees. 
However, the public-sector driven model proved unsustainable, and public 
sector employment has been sharply curtailed since the late 1990s as part 
of a broader program of economic reform and structural adjustment (see 
Assaad, ed. 2009). The resulting informalization of the labor market and 
contraction of social insurance coverage, in combination with the failure of 
social assistance programs to reach a large percentage of the poor (UNDP 
2005; World Bank 2006) have brought into question the efficacy of the 
current social protection scheme and the state’s ability to provide for its 
citizens’ basic welfare. Incomplete and unequal access to social protection 
1     An extensive reform of the social insurance system, Law 135 of 2010, was passed and scheduled to come 
into effect in 2012. However, due to the events of the January 25th, 2011 revolution the status of this law is 
unclear.  This issue will be discussed in detail below.  
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mechanisms, in combination with the low quality of benefits delivered 
by these mechanisms, has furthermore led to the development of private 
markets for social goods and services that should be welfare rights (UNDP 
2005).  
The need to address the shortcomings of the current social protection 
scheme as part of a broader process of developing a new social contract 
between Egypt’s government and its citizens has been noted by academics 
and development practitioners for a number of years (UNDP 2005).  The 
events of the January 25th, 2011 revolution then dramatically demonstrated 
the extent to which Egypt’s populace – and particularly its younger 
generations – had become disillusioned by the failures of the old policy 
regime.  The demands issuing from Tahrir square for jobs, better working 
conditions, and measures to combat poverty all reflect, in part, the 
failures of the existing social protection system.  With a new government 
being put in place, Egypt is now at a potential turning point in terms of 
implementing unfinished reforms or proposing alternative ones. In this 
context, the aim of this paper is to provide an overview and assessment 
of current public social protection mechanisms and suggest directions for 
new policy measures. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews 
the concept of social protection and discusses the scope of the paper; 
Section 3 describes the social insurance system in Egypt, including the legal 
framework, coverage and shortcomings; Section 4 describes the health 
insurance system and some of its shortcomings, and Section 5 addresses 
the public social assistance program that provides non-contributory 
pensions. Section 6 concludes and provides policy recommendations for 
the reform of Egypt’s social protection system.
2. Definitions and Scope 
The concept of social protection came to prominence after the wave 
of structural adjustment programs that swept through the Global South 
in the 1990s.  As the negative consequences of these programs for poverty 
became clearer, the social protection framework sought to develop a more 
comprehensive approach to poverty and vulnerability than the previous 
focus on social safety nets (Barrientos and Hulme 2009; Kabeer 2009). 
Much of the existing literature on social protection has focused on Latin 
America, and, to a lesser degree, South and East Asia.  However, the 
conditions of high levels of poverty and vulnerability, as well as increasing 
labor market informalization, that have motivated the study of social 
protection in these other regions also prevail in Egypt and elsewhere in the 
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Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (see World Bank 2007; Assaad, ed. 
2009). It is therefore important to start bringing this region further into 
the social protection literature. 
A variety of definitions for social protection have been put forward, 
primarily by international development agencies.2 According to Norton 
et al. (2002: 543), common elements across these definitions are a concern 
with addressing risk and vulnerability, as well as absolute deprivation, 
through measures that are “both social and public in character.”  In this 
paper, we follow the ILO’s rights-based conception of social protection, 
under which social protection is defined as the “entitlement to benefits 
that society provides to individuals and households – through public and 
collective measures – to protect against low or declining living standards 
arising out of a number of basic risks and needs” (van Ginneken 2003b, 
p. 11, cited in Barrientos and Hulme 2009).  Put in another way, social 
protection is designed to insure against vulnerability to sudden losses of 
income associated with both expected and unexpected life events such as 
health crises, disability, old age, maternity, or unemployment (ILO 2009). 
A key element of this rights-based approach is that it conceives of social 
protection as part of a state’s obligations to its citizens, rather than a set 
of optional policy mechanisms (Barrientos and Hulme 2009).   
Although the proliferation of definitions has led to different 
understandings of what policies and programs are encompassed by social 
protection, the two core elements are social insurance and social assistance 
(Kabeer 2009).  Social insurance is typically, although not necessarily, 
employment-based, financed by contributions from workers and 
employers.  It provides insurance against contingencies such as maternity, 
sickness, and disability, as well as old age, through risk pooling.  Social 
assistance consists of transfers to the poor or other defined population 
groups usually identified by a form of deprivation.  In its public forms, 
social assistance is typically tax financed.  Social assistance mechanisms 
may consist of pure income transfers (such as non-contributory pensions) 
or transfers conditional on labor supply or human capital investment 
(Norton et al. 2002; Barrientos 2011).  The latter approach has been 
popularized in recent years through Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) 
programs.  
In addition to these two core categories, a range of other mechanisms 
have been considered by some to fall under the umbrella of social 
protection, including labor market regulations, employment support such 
as public works programs, consumer subsidies, and microfinance (Norton 
et al. 2002). These constitute a ‘grey area’ of instruments that fulfill some 
2 For discussions of the role of these different international organizations in promoting social protection, and 
their respective definitions of the concept, see Norton et al. (2002) and Kabeer (2009).
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of social protection’s aims but are not social insurance or social assistance 
(Kabeer 2009).   We exclude these mechanisms from our discussion in this 
paper, focusing on social insurance and public social assistance in the form 
of non-contributory pensions.  These two forms of social protection are 
the most widely accessed by households in Egypt.3 Consumer subsidies, 
probably the most prominent of the grey area mechanisms in the Egyptian 
context, have been extensively covered in other literature (see, e.g., Ahmed 
et al. 2001; World Bank 2010; Fattouh and El Katiri 2012).
3. Social Insurance 
After the 1952 revolution, Egypt put into place a stratified social 
insurance system. The system was originally a fully-funded scheme in 
which employees’ contributions were invested and returned as old age 
pensions, but has gradually shifted to become a partially funded Pay-As-
You-Go (PAYG) system that receives support from the Treasury. Under 
the PAYG system, current benefits for retirees and other beneficiaries are 
paid from the contributions of current workers.  Egypt’s pension system 
is a defined benefits scheme, i.e. pensions are equal to a set percentage of 
the average monthly wage earned (UNDP 2005).  
Egypt has a complex social security system, with different schemes 
for different groups of workers. The National Organization for Social 
Insurance (NOSI) is responsible for managing the two social insurance 
funds; the Government Social Fund (GSF), which encompasses civil 
servants, and the Public and Private Business Sector Fund (PPBSF), which 
covers all other categories including private and public sector employees, 
employers, the self-employed and Egyptians working abroad.  Both funds’ 
budgets are independent of the state budget and are supervised by the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity (formerly the Ministry of Insurance and 
Social Assistance) (Maait et al. 2000).
Egypt’s social insurance system is fragmented into several schemes 
that cover different types of workers. The overall system is regulated by 
four major laws that correspond to the four main schemes; Law 79 of 
1975, Law 108 of 1976, Law 50 of 1978, and Law 112 of 1980.  These laws 
provide coverage for public and private sector wage workers, employers 
and the self-employed, Egyptians working abroad, and irregular or 
“unorganized” workers, respectively (Helmy 2004; SSA 2011). Taken 
together, the entirety of the social insurance system is classified by the 
3 Although private social assistance through NGOs and religious organizations is likely quite extensive in the 
MENA region, these transfers are as of yet not well documented (World Bank 2006).
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ILO as “semi-comprehensive,” providing old age, disability, survivors, 
sickness, maternity, employment injury and unemployment benefits but 
not family allowances (ILO 2010: 203).  However, eligibility for these 
benefits differs across scheme. While the public and private sector wage 
workers scheme (Law 79 of 1975) provides insurance against all of the 
above-mentioned risks, the other schemes provide benefits only in case 
of old age, disability, and survivorship. A significant reform of the social 
insurance system was passed through Law 135 of 2010, but this law has not 
yet been implemented and its status is unclear due to the events of the 
January 25th, 2011 revolution. 
3.1  General Wage Workers Scheme (Law 79/1975)
Law 79 of 1975 outlines the general scheme for the social insurance 
system, insuring all government, public sector and formal private sector 
employees.  The law makes social insurance coverage mandatory for all 
workers age 18 and above in the public and formal private sectors, and 
those age 16 and above in the government (SSA 2011).  Employers are 
responsible for enrolling their employees in the system.
Employees’ contributions are deducted from two types of monthly 
wage earnings: the base wage and the variable wage.4 The original law 
established a cap on the base and variable salaries used for calculating 
contributions, i.e. the maximum pensionable salary.  This maximum 
bound is changed periodically to adjust for inflation and the cost of 
living.  As of 2008, it was set at 775 Egyptian pounds (LE) for the base 
wage and 500 LE for the variable wage (SSA 2009).  Following the January 
25th revolution, reform measures implemented by the Ministry of Finance 
raised these maximum pensionable salary levels to 875 LE for the base 
wage and 1,050 LE for the variable wage (SSA 2011).  In July 2012, the new 
Minister of Social Solidarity passed Decree No. 102 stipulating an annual 
increase of 15% on the maximum pensionable variable wage, in addition 
to immediately raising the cap on the pensionable variable wage to 1,200 
LE and on the pensionable base wage to 900 LE. Thus, the monthly wage 
4 Salaries in Egypt are typically calculated as a base wage, which remains constant from month to month, and 
a variable wage, which includes bonuses, incentives and profit shares and other forms of compensation that 
are not constant (SSA 2011). 
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used to calculate social insurance contributions currently has a maximum 
bound of 2,100 LE.5
Contributions are set as a fixed percentage of the pensionable wage, 
i.e. the wage reported to the social insurance authority up to the set 
maximum levels. The total contribution amounts to 41% of the basic 
wage and 25% of the variable wage, distributed between the employee, the 
employer, and the government.  For the combination of old age, disability 
and survivors benefits, employees contribute 13% and 10% of the base 
and variable salary, respectively, whereas employers contribute 17% and 
15% of the base and variable, respectively. The government contributes 
1% of the base salary in addition to covering any deficit in the system. For 
sickness and maternity insurance, employees and employer contribute 1% 
and 4% of the base salary, respectively. Employers alone bear the cost of 
workplace injury and unemployment insurance, at 3% and 2% of the base 
wage, respectively. Thus, total contribution rates on the basic wage reach 
14% for the employee, 26% for the employer, and 1% for the government 
(Helmy 2004).
3.1.1  Old age, disability and survivor benefits 
Old age pensions may be claimed by insured persons who meet the 
eligibility criteria of being 60 years old (the mandatory retirement age 
in the public sector) with 120 months of contributions, or any age with 
240 months of contributions. A proportional reduction in pension value 
is made in the case of early retirement before age 60 (Helmy 2008; SSA 
2011). The eligibility requirement for a disability pension is three months 
of consecutive contributions or a total of six months of contributions, 
provided that the disability occurred while the individual was contributing 
to social insurance or is within a year of leaving covered employment.  If 
the disability occurred more than a year after leaving covered employment, 
10 years of past contributions are required in order to claim a pension 
(SSA 2011).  
Pensions are calculated through a defined benefit method based on the 
basic and variable wages. The base pension is 1/45th of the monthly base 
reference wage multiplied by the number of years of contributions up to 
36 years. For public sector employees, the base reference wage for this 
calculation is the average of the base monthly wage in the two years prior 






to employment, up to the maximum bound of the insurable wage (e.g. 875 
LE in 2011). For private sector employees, the reference wage is either 
the average monthly wage in the last two years or the average monthly 
wage during the five years prior to the last two years multiplied by 1.4, 
whichever is smaller, again up to the maximum level in that year. Variable 
pensions are calculated as a fraction of the average monthly variable wage, 
with a higher percentage for dangerous work, over the entire contribution 
period increased by 2% for each year of contributions, also up to the 
maximum bound on the insurable variable wage (e.g. 1,050 LE in 2011). 
The maximum pension is set at 80% of the average monthly (base plus 
variable) wage (SSA 2011).  
Survivor benefits are calculated according to the same formula as 
old age and disability pensions.  Benefits are divided among eligible 
dependent family members, who are widows, disabled widowers, parents, 
able-bodied sons or brothers under age 21 (26 if a student), and disabled 
sons or brothers, unmarried sisters and unmarried daughters of any age. 
An additional clause provides for divorced spouses who were married to 
the deceased pensioner for at least 20 years and have no other source of 
income (SSA 2011).  
In addition to a pension, insured workers may be eligible to receive 
other benefits, such as a supplement for contribution periods exceeding 
36 years and/or a lump-sum payment at the time of retirement or disability 
(SSA 2011). Individuals who contributed to the system may also receive a 
settlement, i.e. claim their social insurance contributions, under certain 
conditions if they withdraw from the labor force without having made 
sufficient contributions to receive a pension. Women are eligible to receive 
this settlement at any point with the presentation of a marriage certificate 
and other required paperwork.  Men are eligible to receive a settlement 
upon reaching age 50 or 60 without having made sufficient contributions 
to receive a pension, or in selected other cases including imprisonment, 
emigration, and if his workplace goes bankrupt.6 
3.1.2  Sickness and maternity leave 
Employees covered under social insurance Law 79 of 1975 are eligible 
for a sickness benefit equal to 75% of the last covered wage for up to 
three months, and 85% of the wage for up to an additional three months. 
Contributions must have been paid for the last three months or for at 
least six months total, including the past two months, to be eligible for 
this benefit. This sickness benefit is unrelated to health insurance, which 
is discussed below (SSA 2011). 
6 Interview with a representative of the Social Insurance Administration, 25 June 2012.
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Women covered under social insurance are also legally entitled to three 
months of paid maternity leave for each of up to three children, provided 
they have contributed to social insurance for the prior 10 months. 
Maternity benefits are paid at 75% of the last covered wage (SSA 2011).  In 
addition, women working in establishments with more than 50 employees 
are entitled to up to two years of unpaid childrearing leave per child under 
Egyptian labor law.  Female workers in all establishments are also entitled 
to two half-hour long nursing breaks per day, or one combined hour long 
break, for 24 months after the date of birth of each child.7  
3.1.3  Workplace injury and unemployment 
All workers covered by social insurance are eligible for a workplace 
injury benefit; there are no eligibility criteria in terms of contributions 
made.  For temporary disabilities, 100% of the wage is paid from the 
day after the injury until the worker is either able to return to work or is 
certified as permanently disabled.  For permanent disabilities, the worker 
receives a benefit equal to 80% of the monthly base wage in the year before 
the disability occurred, with a cap of 875 LE (the maximum pension bound 
in 2011) on the wage used to calculate the benefit.  For partial disabilities, 
a percentage of the benefit is paid according to the assessed percentage of 
the disability (SSA 2011).  
Unemployment benefits are available to workers who have made at 
least six months of contributions, including the three months immediately 
prior to unemployment, and who did not leave work voluntarily or as the 
result of misconduct or the refusal of a suitable job offer.  Unemployed 
persons must also be ready to work and registered with the manpower 
office.  Benefits are equal to 60% of the last monthly wage for up to 16 
weeks, or up to 28 weeks if the insured has made at least 24 months of 
contributions (SSA 2011).  However, it is worth noting that the existence 
of this benefit does not seem to be widely known and it appears to be very 
rarely received (Sieverding 2012). 
3.2  Employers and Self-Employed Scheme (Law 108/1976) 
Law 108 of 1976 extends mandatory social insurance coverage for old 
age, disability and survivors benefits to employers and the self-employed 
age 21 to 65 (Maait et al. 2000).  The other benefits afforded to formal 
public and private sector workers, including as maternity leave, health 
insurance, and workplace injury insurance, do not apply to employers and 
the self-employed (Helmy 2004).  Covered categories of workers include 
the self-employed in the commercial, industrial and agricultural sectors, 
7 Labor law Number 12 of 2003, available at http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/pdf/Book2.pdf
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members of production cooperatives who are working on their account, 
owners of real estate that yields at least 250 LE yearly, owners of means 
of transportation, operators of home-based industries employing one or 
more persons, farmers who own 10 feddans or more, and owners of fishing 
boats employing one or more persons.8 
The self-employed must declare their own level of insurable income, 
with the monthly contribution set at 15% of the declared income.  The 
limit on declared income is 1,000 LE monthly.9 Pension eligibility is at age 
65 with 120 months of contributions.10 As with waged employees, pensions 
are calculated as 1/45th of the monthly pensionable income chosen (or the 
average monthly income if the declared level was ever changed), multiplied 
by the number of years contributing. The minimum pension is 50 LE 
per month and the maximum is 80% of the pensionable income chosen 
(Maait et al. 2000).  Early retirement is possible for the self-employed, 
with associated deductions in the pension amount, as it is with waged 
employees.11
3.3 Migrant Workers (Law 50 of 1978) and Casual Laborers (Law 
112 of 1980) 
A system very similar to that for the self-employed and employers, 
with nearly identical eligibility requirements and benefits, also exists for 
Egyptians working abroad, as established by Law 50 of 1978, with the major 
difference that for this group social insurance enrollment is voluntary 
(Helmy 2008). Casual and irregular laborers – or all those not covered by 
another social insurance scheme – are legally required under Law 112 of 
1980 to register with the Comprehensive Social Insurance System (CSIS). 
As with employers, the self-employed and migrants, this scheme for 
casual laborers insures only for old-age, disability and survivors benefits. 
Contributions are made through the purchase of a 1 LE stamp per month 
from one of the NSIO offices.  Pensions are disbursed as a flat rate 63 LE 
per month payment to those who have contributed for at least 120 months 
(Loewe 2004).  As with the social assistance pensions (commonly known 
as Sadat pensions) that were established under Law 112 (see below), the 
CSIS was intended primarily as an income support mechanism for those 
not covered by one of the other three social insurance schemes described 
8 Law 108 of 1976. 
9 Interview with a representative of the Social Insurance Administration, 25 June 2012.
10 Law 108 of 1976.
11 Ibid.  
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above, and its contributions are supplemented by state resources in order 
to cover pension costs (Maait et al. 2000).  
3.4 Coverage and Shortcomings of the Social Insurance System
The current social insurance system was expanded considerably with 
the extension of public sector employment in the 1970s and 1980s, due 
to the fact that all public sector employees are automatically enrolled in 
both the social and health insurance systems.  Fairly high levels of social 
insurance coverage were therefore achieved among the cohorts that 
benefitted from the government hiring schemes implemented during this 
period. However, as shown in Table 1A, current social insurance coverage 
declines significantly among younger groups in the population, from a high 
of 62.5% among male workers age 50 – 59 in 2006 to 20.0% among male 
workers aged 20 - 29.12 This trend is attributable to the decline of public 
sector hiring in Egypt and resulting expansion of informal employment, 
which, by definition, does not provide social insurance coverage. In 
addition, social insurance coverage is lower among rural workers across 
all age groups, reaching a high of only 46.5% among those aged 40 – 49 in 
2006.  Among rural workers aged 25 – 29, only a fifth had social insurance 
coverage
However, for women, social insurance coverage among workers may 
be a poor indication of personal coverage, or coverage in the individual’s 
own name, for the population as a whole.  This is attributable to the fact 
that labor force participation rates among women in Egypt, particularly in 
the formal sector, are quite low (Assaad and El Hamidi 2009). As shown 
in Table 1B, this has a significant effect on social insurance coverage, as 
proxied through current social insurance contributions,13 for the female 
population as a whole.  Using this adjusted measure of coverage, social 
insurance barely exceeds 20% for any age group of women, and declines to 
as little as 3.7% among those 20 – 29.  
12 Figures for the youngest two age groups (15 – 19 and 20 – 29)   in Tables 1A and 1B may be somewhat un-
derestimated because a portion of individuals in these age groups are still in school, and the more educated 
may have higher likelihood of obtaining social insurance through their employment.  
13 Note that this calculation includes only those who are currently contributing to social insurance, not those 
who are currently receiving a pension, so under-estimates the total number of people with individual social 
insurance coverage. 
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Table 1A: Percentage of workers with current personal enrollment in social insurance, by 
age group, gender and residence (2006)
Male Female Urban Rural Total
Age Group
15-19 1.9 0.00 2.1 1.2 1.35
20-29 20.0 25.9 33.6 19.7 22.0
30-39 47.2 45.2 59.9 36.2 46.7
40-49 61.5 53.5 73.5 46.5 59.2
50-59 62.5 44.6 77.3 40.8 58.2
Total 40.6 38.7 56.2 28.4 40.2
Table 1B: Percentage of total population with current personal enrollment in social 
insurance, by age group, gender and residence (2006)
Male Female Urban Rural Total
Age Group
15-19 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-29 12.3 3.7 11.1 5.6 7.8
30-39 45.3 14.2 38.4 24.1 30.6
40-49 59.3 20.1 48.5 31.4 39.6
50-59 55.5 11.4 42.0 23.1 32.3
Total 20.1 5.7 18.0 9.1 12.9
Note: Age groups over 60 are excluded from the table as this is the mandatory retirement age for the public 
sector in Egypt
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey
Gaps in individual social insurance coverage could be mitigated through 
receipt of survivor benefits or shared benefits that will cover more than 
one individual during retirement.  Table 2 shows that just under two-
thirds of male-headed households in which the head is age 60 or above 
were currently receiving a pension compared to 66.2% of female-headed 
households in the same age group. A significant percentage of female-
headed households in which the head was under 60 were also receiving 
pensions, many of which are likely survivors’ benefits given the fairly low 
rate of female labor force participation. 
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Table 2: Percentage of households currently receiving a social insurance pension, by age 
and sex of household head and region of residence











Table 3: Percentage of households in which at least one member is currently enrolled in 
social insurance or currently receiving a pension, by age of household head (2006)
Age Group of Household Head Urban Rural Total
25-29 50.7 26.6 37.2
30-39 61.3 45.2 52.6
40-49 74.4 57.7 65.6
50-59 84.1 55.3 69.7
60+ 84.9 55.8 71.9
Total 73.3 49.2 61.0
Taking current pension receipt and social insurance enrollment (as 
an indicator of the future right to a pension) together, Table 3 shows the 
percent of households who were either currently receiving a pension or had 
at least one member enrolled in social insurance as of 2006. This measure 
shows that social insurance coverage reaches its highest levels (84.9%) 
among older urban households. Among rural households, in contrast, 
the highest coverage rates are seen among households in which the head 
is age 40 – 49, at 57.7%. Coverage levels among households headed by 
an individual age 20 - 25 are considerably lower, at 50.7% for the urban 
population and 26.6% for the rural population. A major challenge facing 
the social insurance system is thus to increase coverage among these 
youngest households. 
In fact, Egypt benefits from a large youth population that, if enrolled 
in social insurance, could contribute greatly to ensuring the system’s 
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financial health (UNDP 2005). This financial aspect adds an additional 
incentive to increasing social insurance enrollment among younger 
workers, in addition to the issue of providing greater security for their 
families.  However, as the system presently functions, evasion from social 
insurance contributions has a significant negative impact on the total 
value of contributions. Figures from the Ministry of Insurance in 2003, 
(cited in Helmy 2004) suggest that 30% of private sector companies either 
do not pay social insurance contributions for their employees at all, or pay 
contributions for only some of their employees, and that 40% of private 
sector employers and employees report a salary to social insurance that is 
less than their actual salary.  
In terms of discouraging evasion and increasing incentives to social 
insurance participation, one of the most important shortcomings of the 
current social insurance system is that it acts as a regressive tax due to 
the cap/ceiling on pensionable wages explained above.  In other words, 
low-wage workers pay contributions on their full earnings while high-
wage workers whose earnings exceed the legal pensionable wage ceiling 
pay contributions on only a part of their wage.  Low-wage workers 
therefore have even more of an incentive to underreport their wages to 
evade the high contribution levels. In addition, by putting a ceiling on the 
pensionable wage, the system loses part of the contributions that could 
have been collected from the high-wage workers if there was no ceiling 
(Helmy 2008). In general, the high contribution rates charged by the 
system likely discourage participation on the part of both employees and 
employers. By comparison, contribution rates in other MENA countries, 
such as the Maghreb countries and Jordan, are much lower, ranging from 
8 – 14% (Helmy 2008).  
Another shortcoming of the current system is the means by which 
pensions are calculated. The fact that wages are calculated based only on 
the last years of service encourages workers and their employers to collude 
to underreport the employee’s pensionable wage during their earlier years 
of service, then report their full wages only in the years immediately 
prior to retirement and thereby receive a higher pension (Loewe 2004). 
In some cases, employers also underreport their employees’ pensionable 
wages in order to lower the value of the employer’s required contributions 
(Maait et al. 2000). Maait et al. (2000) find that pensionable salaries in the 
government began to diverge markedly from pensionable salaries in the 
public and private production sectors, with the former increasing more 
rapidly than the latter during the second half of the 1980s when privatization 
was beginning.  Although not conclusive, this is consistent with a scenario 
in which salaries in the private sector are being underreported, which 
would cause growth in the pensionable salary to stall (regardless of trends 
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in actual salary being paid). This issue will have significant implications for 
the financial sustainability of the social insurance system if not addressed. 
A less obvious but perhaps even more important aspect of the current 
gaps in social insurance coverage is that unequal access to social protection 
mechanisms can actually increase socioeconomic inequality, particularly 
when social protection only reaches groups that are already fairly privileged 
in the labor market, such as formal sector workers, while failing to reach 
the most vulnerable, e.g. farmers and casual workers (Norton et al. 2002). 
Loewe (2004) argues that Egypt’s social insurance system does in fact 
benefit the urban and middle classes more than the poorest segments of 
society, which are concentrated in rural areas and among the under - or 
unstably employed.  In terms of the rural-urban divide, this assertion is 
certainly supported by the coverage figures discussed above.  The World 
Bank (2007) finds that 80% of pension spending goes to the non-poor, 
which likewise supports the claim that social protection is not adequately 
combating inequality.  It is also worth reiterating that self-employed and 
casual workers, who by the nature of their employment are likely exposed 
to greater job instability and wage fluctuations than formal sector wage 
employees, do not benefit from all of the social insurance benefits that 
formal sector workers do, including maternity leave, workplace disability 
compensation, and sickness coverage.   
Finally, several types of problems with the structure and value of returns 
to pension contributions have been noted by different analysts. Early 
retirement criteria are quite lenient, and reductions made to the pension 
of workers who take early retirement are lower than what is actuarially 
sound (Loewe 2004; Helmy 2008). At the same time, returns to pension 
contributions are in general low (with the exception of the scheme for 
casual workers), despite the high contribution rates. This is due in part to 
the fact that pension values are not automatically adjusted for inflation, 
but rather are subject to periodic increases by the government (Maait et al. 
2000; Loewe 2004). In the face of fairly high inflation rates, which peaked 
at 25% in 1986, real pension values eroded significantly (Maait et al. 2000). 
More recent data from the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) 
indicate that pension values are low relative to the cost of living; among 
households receiving pensions in 2006, the average monthly payment was 
484 LE.14 These figures are comparable to those Loewe (2004) cites from 
the ILO in 1998, finding that the average public sector employee received 
a pension of 4,727 LE per year (356 LE per month), while the average 
private sector employee received 1,716 LE per year (143 LE per month). 
14 Authors’ calculations from the ELMPS. The accuracy of household reports of the value of their pension re-
ceipts has not been assessed.  However, even substantial under-reporting of pension values is unlikely to 
cause such a large gap between average household receipts and the poverty line.  
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However, when compared with national poverty line estimates from 2005 
that categorize households with a monthly income of less than 994 LE 
as extremely poor and those with less than 1,423 LE as poor (World Bank 
2007), both of these figures indicate that pension values are not nearly 
sufficient to maintain a household above or even at the poverty line.
  
3.5 Towards a New Social Insurance System: Law 135 of 2010
Prior the occurrence of the January 25th, 2011 revolution, a major reform 
of the social insurance system was scheduled to go into effect on January 
1st, 2012. This reform, passed through Law 135 of 2010, would gradually 
move Egypt from its current defined-benefits PAYG system to a defined-
contribution notional accounts system (SSA 2010; Sabreen and Maait 2011). 
Notional accounts are virtual individual accounts that record employees’ 
contributions, which are then disbursed at the time of retirement with 
interest. The system also provides for solidarity accounts, to which a set 
percentage of each individual’s contributions will be paid; if and when the 
individual’s retirement account is exhausted, he or she may draw a certain 
amount from the solidarity fund (Sabreen and Maait 2011).  
Law 135 also included a reduction in the contribution rates on basic 
wages to 11% for the employee and 19.5% for the employer (compared 
to the current 14% and 26%, respectively) and eliminated the cap on the 
pensionable salary.  These measures would effectively lower contribution 
levels for low-earning workers and raise them for high-earning ones (those 
earning more than about 3,000 LE per month). The law also provides for 
the regular adjustment of pensions for inflation, as long as the inflation 
rate is above 8% (Sabreen and Maait 2011). The new reform would raise 
the retirement age to 65 instead of 60 years old. This increase in age will 
occur gradually, with the retirement age set to 61 in 2015, 62 in 2018, 64 in 
2024, and finally reaching 65 in 2027 (SSA 2010). 
In addition to these changes in the contributory pension system, Law 
135 would establish a minimum pension for all persons aged 65 or over 
who do not have another form of old-age support, regardless of whether 
or not they had participated in the pension scheme.  This minimum 
pension would be equal to 15% of the national average wage.  In an 
effort to encourage participation among informal sector workers, the 
government will contribute an additional amount equal to 25% of the 
individual’s contributions to the pension accounts of seasonal workers and 
farmers.  Finally, the law extends unemployment insurance, which would 
be available to all workers who have contributed to social insurance for 
at least 12 months. The maximum period for receiving unemployment 
benefits would be 12 months at a rate that gradually reduces over time 
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from 65% of the average wage in the year prior to unemployment (Sabreen 
and Maait 2011).  
4. Health Insurance
The ILO defines social health protection as “all public and private 
measures that aim at achieving universal access to health services” (ILO 
2009: 6). Egypt has a fragmented health care system with several different 
types of service providers and funders that fit this definition.  These 
include the social health insurance system, which is managed by the Health 
Insurance Organization (HIO), and a system of government hospitals and 
other healthcare facilities that provide services to the uninsured at highly 
subsidized rates (Maeda and El Saharty 2008). In this section we focus 
on the HIO, which is most closely linked to social insurance, as a full 
discussion of the subsidized government health care system is beyond the 
scope of this review.15
Health insurance coverage has been extended to different groups of the 
population under several different laws. Initially established in Alexandria 
in 1964, the system was intended to be expanded to cover the entire 
Egyptian population within ten years. However, it was only in 1975 that 
Laws 32 and 79 expanded health insurance to all government and public 
sector employees, as well as pensioners and those receiving survivors’ 
benefits who chose to pay contributions (UNDP 2005). Law 32 covered 
government workers, whereas Law 79 covers public and private sector 
workers. Contributions for the latter group are higher, at 1% of the salary 
for the employee and 4% for the employer, than for the former, at 0.5% 
and 1.5% of the salary for the employee and employer, respectively.  Law 79 
also extended health insurance coverage to pensioners and those receiving 
survivor benefits; pensioners pay 1% of their pension as a contribution 
and individuals receiving survivor benefits pay a contribution of 2% of the 
pension (Maeda and El Saharty 2008).  
Health insurance eligibility was not expanded again until 1992, when 
Law 99 of that year extended coverage to all students through high school. 
The contribution is 4 LE per student, with the government making up the 
rest of the funding for this group. Finally, in 1997, Decree 380 extended 
coverage to pre-school age children with an enrollment contribution of 5 
LE per child (UNDP 2005; Maeda and El Saharty 2008). Of these different 
categories of coverage, only workers covered under Law 32 and pre-school 
15 More comprehensive discussions of the different components of Egypt’s health care system can be found in 
Maeda and El Saharty (2008) and ILO (2009).    
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aged children also must pay a token deductible (less than 1 LE) for health 
visits.  For medications, workers covered under Law 32 pay 50% of the 
costs and both categories of children 33%; workers covered under Law 79 
do not pay any deductibles or contributions for medications (Maeda and 
El Saharty 2008).  
The HIO operates its own network of health care facilities for its 
beneficiaries. It also contracts with additional private doctors to work in 
these facilities, with other private and public facilities for services, and 
with pharmacies, in order to provide additional services for those covered 
by health insurance (Maeda and El Saharty 2008). The other public health 
care schemes in Egypt also operate their own facilities, contributing to 
the fragmentation of service provision as well as funding for health care 
(Ministry of Health, Egypt and Health Systems 20/20 2010).  
4.1 Coverage and Shortcomings of the Health Insurance System
Citing the HIO annual reports for 2002/2003 and 2004, Maeda and 
El Saharty (2008) put the number of health insurance enrollees in 2005 
at 3.74 million government employees, 3.29 million public and private 
sector employees, and 1.75 million pensioners and those receiving survivor 
benefits, compared to 16.89 million students and 9.14 million pre-school 
age children.  These figures clearly demonstrate that the two groups of 
children comprise a much more substantial proportion of health insurance 
recipients (80%) than those who are enrolled due to current or past labor 
force participation.  
Altogether, just over half of the population (55%) was covered by health 
insurance as of 2007/08, up from 35% in 1994/95 (Ministry of Health, 
Egypt and Health Systems 20/20 2010).  However, only a third of the labor 
force is covered by HIO, and Maeda and El Saharty (2008) estimate that 
less than 5% of private sector workers are covered. They attribute this in 
part to the fact that small and medium enterprises are not required to 
enroll their employees in health insurance, unlike social insurance.  
Despite this increase in the percentage of the population covered by 
health insurance, financial analyses of Egypt’s health care system agree that 
households pay for nearly two-thirds of health care expenditures in Egypt. 
The percentage of costs covered by households has been cited at 60.0% 
(Ministry of Health, Egypt and Health Systems 20/20 2010) to 62.2% 
(Maeda and El Saharty 2008). The next largest source of financing is the 
government, at around 35.5% of health care costs, with the HIO managing 
only 8.06% of total health care finances. Out-of-pocket spending on health 
care has been growing faster than government spending; the percentage 
of health costs covered by households is up to its current levels from 51% 
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of total health spending in 1994/95 (Maeda and El Saharty 2008; Ministry 
of Health, Egypt and Health Systems 20/20 2010). Poor households also 
spend a larger proportion of their income on health care than wealthier 
ones; Egyptian households in the lowest wealth quintile spend 10% of 
their household income compared to 7% among those in the highest 
wealth quintile (Salah 2007). This represents a significant financial burden 
on poor households, and exposes them to health shocks that can play a 
significant role in pushing vulnerable households into poverty (Norton et 
al. 2002).   
As noted by Maeda and El Saharty (2008) the high proportion of health 
care costs borne by households may be related to several deficiencies in 
the HIO system, including the fact that some medical services are not 
covered by HIO, requiring patients to pay out-of-pocket, and the poor 
quality of government health services, which may push even those covered 
by HIO to seek private health care services.16  The ILO (2009) suggests 
that the large extension in coverage that resulted from Law 99 and Decree 
380 may have placed a burden on the system that contributed to declines 
in quality, in part because the contributions required from these groups 
were not based on an actuarially sound analysis of the costs this expansion 
would entail. 
In addition to the well-noted financial strains on the health care system 
and the associated issues with quality of service, several other elements 
of the HIO eligibility structure may restrict enrollment.  One current 
shortcoming is that there is no provision for covering the dependents of 
HIO beneficiaries under the beneficiary’s insurance. Although children 
under 18 are now covered by the expansions of the 1990s, there is no 
mechanism for providing coverage to children in university or women out 
of the labor force unless they are receiving survivors’ benefits (Maeda and 
El Saharty 2008).  
In general, health insurance and other programs intended to subsidize 
health care for those in need are poorly targeted. UNDP (2005), citing 
data from the Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP), 
finds that while the combination of health care programs subsidizes just 
over 80% of health care costs for the two highest income quintiles, only 
about half of health care costs for those in the poorest wealth quintile are 
subsidized.  Salah (2007), also citing MOHP data, puts this in the terms 
that 35% of government spending on healthcare goes to the wealthiest 
quintile, whereas only 12% goes to the poorest. Healthcare spending is 
also biased in favor of men and urban areas due to the association between 
health insurance and formal sector, particularly government, employment. 
In short, a lack of efficiency and equity in Egypt’s current health 
16 This suggestion is supported by the qualitative paper in this working paper series. See Sieverding (2012). 
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care system, including health insurance, is an issue agreed upon by most 
analysts (UNDP 2005, Salah 2007, Maeda and El Saharty 2008, ILO 2009). 
Some effort to address this was made under the former regime through 
an initiative to expand and reform the health insurance system that was 
introduced in 2005.  Among broader goals for improving the performance 
and financial sustainability of the health care system, the initiative 
aimed to extend social health insurance to all Egyptians and merge all of 
the components of the health care system into a national social health 
insurance scheme over the medium term (Salah 2007). Several draft laws 
were subsequently introduced to Parliament (see ILO 2009 for text), but 
the results of this initiative are unclear.  
However, it is worth mentioning that at the end of July 2012 health 
insurance coverage was extended to all women heads of household through 
a law that was passed by the new Parliament on May 26 of the same year. 
To be covered by the law, women must meet certain eligibility criteria: 
being the head of the household, having no source of income or an income 
that does not exceed 150% of the social pension value (“ma’ash al daman”, 
see next section), and being outside of the health insurance system. The 
beneficiary population is estimated at around 5 million women, who will 
be eligible to enroll in the health insurance system by paying a contribution 
of 12 LE or 1% of their annual income. The government will subsidize 
this contribution by paying the health insurance system 200 LE for each 
beneficiary.17
5. Social assistance 
Egypt’s social assistance program is administered by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs (MOSA).  Along with the food subsidy program and the Social 
Fund for Development, it is considered one of Egypt’s three main safety 
nets.However, it receives by far the smallest portion of the total budget 
allocated to these three programs (only 2%) (Sabry 2005). Social assistance 
is administered as a monthly non-contributory pension; originally named 
Sadat pensions, the program was renamed Mubarak pensions, and are 
now officially called MOSA Social Solidarity pensions,18 “ma’ash al daman,” 
although often still popularly referred to by previous names.  
17 http://shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=29072012&id=872e8e55-1d85-4a90-8023-fb9aef-
f83e6b
18 Interview with a representative of the Social Insurance Administration, 25 June 2012.
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The non-contributory pension system was established by Law 112 of 
1980, the same law that legally extended social insurance coverage to casual 
workers (Helmy 2008). To be eligible, individuals must not be receiving 
another type of pension, and must be considered part of one of society’s 
most vulnerable groups, including divorced, widowed, and abandoned 
women, other women with no male provider, orphans, the elderly, and 
households in which the male head is unable to work (Sabry 2005). In 
short, the pensions are targeted toward households with no male provider 
capable of earning a labor income.  
The value of the non-contributory pension is determined by the size 
and composition of the beneficiary household.  According to Sabry (2005), 
in the early 2000s this ranged from 50 LE per month for an elderly person 
on their own to 70 LE per month for a disabled man with three children. 
The pension value was increased to 124 LE per month prior to the January, 
25th revolution. Then, shortly after the revolution, the new Ministry of 
Finance further raised the pension to 200 LE per month.19 Most recently, 
after the 2012 presidential elections, the new President Mohammed Morsi 
increased the pension value to a maximum of 300 LE per month per 
household. The pension value will be determined by household size; a one-
person household will now receive 215 LE per month, compared to 145 LE 
prior to the increase. Pension values for two- and three- and four-person 
households will increase from 160 LE to 240 LE, 185 LE to 275 LE, and 205 
to 300 LE, respectively.20
5.1 Coverage, Targeting and Shortcomings of the Social Assistance 
System 
The current non-contributory pension scheme suffers from several 
serious shortcomings, including limited coverage, very low pension 
values, and bias in administration. Among the current generation of 
older households in which the head is age 60 or above, only 12.7% were 
receiving a non-contributory pension in 2006, compared to 63.4% that 
were receiving a public contributory (social insurance) pension.  Receipt 
of non-contributory pensions is concentrated among female-headed 
households, of whom 15.6% were receiving a pension in 2006, compared 
to 4.4% of male-headed households.  As shown in Table 4, receipt of non-
contributory pensions is higher among female headed households at all 
age groups, reaching a high of 19.3% among those in which the head is 




to increase with age, expanding the population of women eligible for a 
pension.  Non-contributory pensions are also more prevalent in rural areas, 
where poverty rates are higher than in urban ones (World Bank 2007), and 
particularly among rural female headed households.21  
Table 4: Percentage of households currently receiving a non-contributory pension, by age 
and sex of household head and region of residence











Source: Authors› calculations from the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 
This distribution of non-contributory pensions represents both the 
failure to cover most poor households and a substantial leakage of funds 
to non-poor households. The World Bank estimates that public social 
assistance reaches less than 12% of Egypt’s poor (2006), and that as much 
as 70% of social assistance payments go to the non-poor (2007).  Although 
pension receipt should legally be means-tested through household visits, 
the ability to carry this out effectively may be weak (World Bank 2006). 
On the other hand, ethnographic accounts suggest that determination of 
whether an applicant meets the means eligibility criteria is based on the 
subjective judgment of MOSA employees (Bibars 2001; Sabry 2005).  Bibars 
(2001) also finds that access to pensions is complicated by the fact that 
many women do not have IDs, and that application procedures are long 
and burdensome.  She also documents the norms of male providership that 
are deeply embedded in the social assistance program and the attitudes of 
those who administer it, leading to biases that restrict effective access 
for some eligible groups of women (such as those who were abandoned 
by their husbands or are deemed pretty enough to remarry) as well as 
humiliation for those completing the application process. 
21  Authors’ calculations based on the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS).
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In addition, the values of non-contributory pensions described above 
are extremely low. Data from the ELMPS indicate that on average, 
households receiving a non-contributory state pension in 2006 received 
78 LE; 80.5 LE on average among male headed households and 74.8 LE 
among female headed households.22 Based on the World Bank (2007) 
poverty lines cited above, this means that the average social assistance 
pension is equal to 7.8% of the ‘very poor’ poverty line and 5.5% of the 
‘poor’ poverty line. This is very similar to the figure cited by the World 
Bank itself that social assistance provides a benefit equal to 8% of the 
poverty line for a family of five in Upper Egypt (2006). Sabry (2005), using 
a range of poverty lines and pension values based on family size, finds 
that pensions vary from 6% - 55% of the poverty line depending on the 
definition used.  Even the maximum social assistance pension of 300 LE 
under the recently implemented increase corresponds to only 30.2% of 
the World Bank’s ‘very poor’ poverty line and 21.1% of the ‘poor’ poverty 
line in 2007.  
Several other types of social assistance programs have been piloted in 
Egypt recently, drawing on the growing international body of innovative 
research and programming in this area. A Conditional Cash Transfer 
program is being piloted in Ain es Sira, a slum of Cairo.23 In 2008, the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity, in collaboration with many other ministries, 
also began a strategy to identify and improve living conditions in Egypt’s 
1,000 poorest villages through an integrated program that addresses 
health, housing and local development, water and sanitation, primary 
education, job opportunities for youth, and small and medium enterprise 
development (UNDP 2010). Additional efforts to expand the scope and 
efficacy of social assistance programs are urgently called for in order to 
expand social protection access to a greater portion of the population. 
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This review of Egypt’s social protection policies, which encompassed 
social insurance, health insurance, and social assistance, has highlighted 
that across these three key areas, it is not the legal framework but rather the 
efficient and equitable management of social protection mechanisms that 
is the greatest challenge moving forward.  In the face of incomplete and 
inequitable coverage across different groups of the population, and the low 
value of benefits provided, Egypt’s social protection system faces not only 
22  Authors’ calculations from the ELMPS. 
23  See http://www.pathwaysofempowerment.org/research_empowering_projects.html#CashTransfers
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significant financial challenges, but also the prospect that participation 
will come to be viewed as a poor investment or irrelevant to households’ 
needs.  This will only encourage evasion of a social insurance system that 
already suffers from declining coverage, and will continue to push the 
burden of health care costs onto over-stretched household budgets.  Most 
importantly, it leaves a significant portion of Egypt’s poorest and most 
vulnerable population without access to the social protection mechanisms 
needed to sustain their livelihoods. 
Although a number of studies have made recommendations for the 
reform of the social insurance, health insurance or, to a lesser extent, 
social assistance systems in Egypt, it is important to remember that 
these three systems interact with one another and changes to any one 
may have unintended impacts on the others. The design of any new social 
assistance program targeting those who are excluded from contributory 
social protection programs should take into consideration the potential 
to reduce incentives for enrolling in social insurance. Several studies from 
Latin America, for example, have found that in the case of female wage 
workers in Mexico City (Juarez 2008) and among workers in several cities of 
Colombia (Camacho et al. 2009), reforms instituting free health care were 
associated with a negative effect on workers’ likelihood of being enrolled 
in social security and health insurance, respectively.  For such reasons, 
social protection reform should be approached holistically, with careful 
consideration of how reforms to any one of the three major systems might 
positively or adversely affect the coverage of the others, as well as progress 
toward the overall goal of providing universal access to social protection.   
That said, there are several policy measures that should be considered for 
each of the three major systems described. Some of the recommendations 
below draw from literature on the Egyptian case specifically, some from 
the experience of other developing countries. However, whenever studying 
social protection reform measures adopted by other countries, regardless 
of their degree of success, it is important to consider the applicability 
of these measures to the local context. And, to reiterate, all of the 
recommendations below should be considered in terms of their potential 
effects on progress toward the overall goal of extending social protection 
access to all Egyptians.
  
Social Insurance
As highlighted in the discussion above, the social insurance system faces 
a number of challenges in terms of efficacy and equity. Policy measures 
to address these challenges can be loosely grouped into the three inter-
related categories of strengthening the link between contribution and 
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benefit levels, expanding coverage, and improving the administration of 
the system. 
Linking benefits more closely to workers’ contributions is critical not 
only for the long-term financial sustainability of the system, but also for 
improving the transparency of the system and encouraging enrollment. 
An important step towards strengthening the contributions-benefits link 
is to implement the notional accounts system proposed under Law 135 
of 2010.  Again, this system would establish individual virtual accounts 
into which workers’ contributions would be deposited, to be then 
dispersed as pension benefits with interest upon retirement (Sabreen and 
Maait 2011).  A move to a notional accounts system would have several 
important advantages.  In addition to being actuarially sounder, a notional 
accounts system should improve returns to pension contributions, and 
allow workers to see a more direct link between what they have paid and 
their retirement benefit (Ribe et al. 2010). With a clear link between 
contributions and benefits, workers will better be able to see how their 
contributions are in fact a form of investment for the future (of course, 
this investment must be earning a reasonable return for this to be the 
case). Furthermore, pension values would no longer be based only on the 
last years of service, but rather on the entire period of contributions. This 
will reduce the incentive for employees to under-report their wages during 
their earlier years of employment (Sabreen and Maait 2011).  
The overall reduction in contribution rates proposed under Law 135 
of 2010 should also be implemented as high contribution rates may serve 
as a disincentive for enrollment among workers and employers (Loewe 
2004; Helmy 2008). At the same time, the calculation of benefits should 
be revisited in line with a new notional accounts system. It is important 
that benefit levels reflect a fair return to workers’ contributions. In 
order to achieve this, benefit levels should be ‘automatically’ adjusted for 
inflation rather than subject to periodic increases that may not reflect 
actual changes in the cost of living (Mait et al. 2000, Loewe 2004). Pension 
values should also be adjusted for changes in life expectancy. Finally, as it 
has been well-noted that the reductions in pension values for early retirees 
are not actuarially sound, an adjustment to early retirement benefits rates 
should also be examined (Loewe 2004; Helmy 2008).
Another element of Law 135 of 2010 that should be implemented is 
the elimination of the ceiling on pensionable wages. As noted above, 
this ceiling acts as a regressive tax and is a factor contributing to low 
pension values. It also means that the social insurance system is forgoing 
contributions on a significant part of high-earners’ wages. Removing this 
ceiling is therefore an important step towards improving the link between 
contributions and benefits (Helmy 2004, 2008).   
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All of the measures discussed above will have the effect of improving 
the return to social insurance contributions, and should thereby create a 
greater incentive for workers to enroll.  In other words, improving the link 
between contributions and benefits is also the first step towards expanding 
social insurance coverage among groups that currently see participation as 
too expensive or a poor investment. More direct incentives can also be 
provided to encourage informal workers and the self-employed to enroll 
in social insurance.  For example, under Law 135 of 2010, an additional 
measure was to be put in place under which the government would provide 
a matching contribution equal to 25% of the worker’s contributions to the 
accounts of farmers and seasonal workers who enrolled in social insurance 
(Sabreen and Maait 2011). This measure should be piloted and studied in 
order to measure its potential to improve participation among the most 
vulnerable groups of workers, including but not necessarily limited to 
those groups identified under Law 135 of 2010. In doing so, it is important 
that incentives be structured carefully so as to encourage savings and not 
to discourage the movement of vulnerable workers into more stable forms 
of employment.  
In addition to informal workers, women are a group with relatively 
low rates of individual access to social insurance because of their low 
levels of labor force participation. On the one hand, expanding social 
insurance coverage among male workers will increase the percentage 
of women who are eligible for survivors’ benefits. However, individual 
rather than household-level access to benefits may be more effective in 
terms of reducing women’s vulnerability (Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer 
2003).  Therefore, options should be explored for establishing a voluntary, 
contributory pension fund for women who are out of the labor force.  Such 
a fund might allow women to contribute at a chosen level, like the current 
system for the self-employed, perhaps with some level of matching benefits 
from the state to encourage participation.  Again, the potential effects of 
such a system on women’s labor force participation, and participation in 
the regular pension fund or social assistance, would have to be carefully 
explored.  
Finally, improving the administration of the social insurance system 
will require improved enforcement of social insurance law. The negative 
effects of evasion on both the financial health of the system and workers’ 
access to social protection have been well-noted (Mait et al. 2000; Loewe 
2004; Helmy 2004, 2008). Another important step towards more efficient 
administration is the computerization of the social insurance system. 
This would entail providing each worker with a unique social insurance 
number, similar to the current system for national ID numbers, to which 
all contributions would be linked. Computerization would help streamline 
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NOSI record-keeping and allow for easy tracking of workers’ progress 
towards the minimum 120 months of contributions, as well as their 
contribution levels, even when workers change jobs frequently. Moving to 
a computerized system is particularly important in the event that Egypt 
does move to a notional accounts system, as this type of system requires 
high administrative capacity as well as careful management of funds 
independently of the regular state budget (Helmy 2004).  
An additional benefit of computerization is that workers could then 
be provided access to their individual records, either through an online 
system or public information desks. Workers could then view their own 
records and know how many months they need for pension eligibility.  The 
system could also provide estimates of the individual’s future pension value 
based on current contributions, and additional voluntary contributions 
if they were made, allowing workers to see more the link between their 
contributions and benefits. It may also encourage workers, and particularly 
the self-employed, to increase their contributions in order to receive a 
larger pension in the future. An experiment to provide such online access 
to social insurance records is currently being conducted on the NOSI 




In the medium - to long-term, a systematic reorganization and 
unification of Egypt’s national health care system needs to be undertaken 
in order to improve the efficiency and efficacy of the system (see Maeda 
and El Saharty 2008 for a more extensive discussion of this issue). This 
process should include a full review of the role of the HIO in providing and 
paying for health care.  Expanding health insurance coverage should be an 
important aim of any reform of the health insurance system. However, it 
is equally important that quality of services be improved, as this has been 
widely noted as a major problem in the current system. The poor quality of 
services for health insurance beneficiaries also serves as a disincentive to 
participation (Sieverding 2012), which will inhibit any attempts to expand 
coverage.  
One measure that could be undertaken in the short- to medium- term 
to expand health insurance coverage – as long as the implications for 
quality of service are adequately dealt with – is the extension of coverage 
to all dependents of current health insurance beneficiaries that are not 
already covered. As Maeda and El Saharty note (2008), this would entail 
relatively less administrative burden than other methods of coverage 
expansion because the main insurance holder is already registered with 
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HIO. Providing coverage to dependents might also increase the appeal 
of health insurance for workers.  In Uruguay, for example, Cruces and 
Bergolo (2011) found that the extension of health insurance benefits to the 
dependents of workers registered with the social insurance system (which 
provides pension, health and other benefits in a single package) decreased 
rates of informality.  The authors conclude that workers thus responded 
positively when additional incentives were built into the social insurance 
system.     
Social Assistance
In order to serve as an effective form of social protection for Egyptian 
society as a whole, the social assistance system must expand coverage to 
the poor while reducing the leakage of benefits to those who do not need 
them. An important step that can be taken towards expanding coverage is 
implementation of the minimum pension clause stipulated in Law 135 of 
2010, in order to provide social protection access to all elderly individuals. 
This expansion, which would make men over age 65 eligible for social 
protection, may also help counter the perception that non-contributory 
pensions are only for women with no provider.  As noted in the literature 
on gender and social protection (Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer 2003), 
targeting programs towards narrow groups, including women with no 
provider, may have a stigmatizing effect on social assistance.  
Another means of reaching more poor households through social 
assistance, while reducing the degree to which social assistance is targeted 
to women without a male provider, is to expand eligibility criteria to include 
all very poor households even if an able-bodied male head is present.  Any 
such expansion would have to carefully consider the potential to create a 
dis-incentive for labor force participation, but could have the potential to 
dramatically increase the percentage of poor households that have access 
to social assistance. Improving the capacity of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs to conduct accurate and fair means-testing of social assistance 
applicants would also be an important step towards reducing leakages to 
the non-poor while expanding social assistance coverage.   
In addition to expanding coverage, social assistance benefits must be 
brought more in line with the cost of living in order to afford beneficiaries 
a decent living.  The recent increases implemented since the January 25th, 
2011 revolution are important steps in this direction.  However, benefit 
amounts remain significantly below the poverty line.  The periodic 
increasing of benefit levels also has the effect of politicizing the social 
assistance system, turning increases into a gesture of government charity 
rather than incorporating them as part of a well-functioning social 
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assistance system that is a welfare right for vulnerable groups (Sabry 
2005). As with social insurance, social assistance benefit amounts should 
therefore be linked to a consumer price index and adjusted automatically 
with inflation.  If implemented, the minimum pension for citizens over 
age 65 should be subject to the same process.  Although the minimum 
pension is tied the national average wage, the proposed 15% bar may be 
quite low in monetary terms.  The adequacy of this standard for supporting 
a household should be studied, and the alternative of linking the minimum 
pension to a price index rather than wage levels considered.  
Finally, a growing body of international literature suggests that a 
move towards conditional forms of social assistance that aim to build 
the human capital of poor households can be a more empowering and, 
over the long run, effective means of reducing poverty (Barrientos et al. 
2010).24  By requiring investments in health and education, Conditional 
Cash Transfers and similar mechanisms may have more empowering 
effects for beneficiary households.  Investments in children spurred by 
CCT programs also have the potential to reduce the inter-generational 
reproduction of poverty.  The current CCT pilot program in Ain es Sira is 
a positive step towards exploring the potential of this new generation of 
social assistance programs for Egypt, and other innovative, development-
oriented social assistance programs should be encouraged and piloted.  
24 Barrientos et al. 2010 provide a comprehensive listing of social assistance programs around the world, 
including objectives, targeting, and a summary of results from evaluations when these are available.  
References to program-specific documents and evaluation reports are also provided.   
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